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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLAIR R. LISTER, BEN
BOYCE, EVAN J. LISTER
AND CARLISLE JOHNSON,
vs.

Plaintiffs

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

Case No.
12133

Defendant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action for wage claims against the defendant,
who provided the insurance bond indemnifying wage
claimants against James A. Wardle Construction Company; That Construction Company did default and the
plaintiffs here seek certain wages and equipment rental.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff motioned for Summary Judgment and stipulated that defendant's motion for Summary Judgment
could be heard at the same time. The defendant con-
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ten_de,d that plaintiff's cause of action is barred because
suit was not filed against this defendant within the six
month limitaiton specified in the insurance bond issued
by defendant. The Trial Court found in favor of defen.
dant and dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs' with preju.
dice upon the merits.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Trial Court's Sum.
mary Judgment in favor of defendant and a Judgment in
plaintiffs' favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs, Clair R. Lister, Ben Boyce, Evan J. Lister
and Carlisle Johnson were employees of the James A
"\\l ardle Construction Company for certain periods of
time prior to the 27th day of December, 1961, and on that
date said construction company ceased doing business
in that capacity, but was bonded by defendant herein.
(Ex. 1 and 2, plaintiffs' memorandum)
On January 12, 1962, a letter was written by Wade
A. Perong of R. J. Daum Construction Company to Insurance Adjustment, Inc., and said letter alleges that the
claims of Evan J. Listre, Ben Boyce and Clair R. Lister,
three of the four plaintiffs herein, were enclosed therein.
(Ex. "A'', plaintiffs' memorandum)
Thereafter, on a date prior to the 15th day of Febru·
ary, 1962, Evan J. Lister, along with James A. \\Tardie,
of "'ardle Construction Company, went to the office of
J. D. Hagman, Jr., :\Ianager of Insurance Adjustment,
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Inc., whereupon said Evan J. Lister was led to believe
that J. D. Hagman represented the bonding company and
said Hagman made the following statement:
"If Wardle can't pay you fellows your wage claims
we will, because that is what bonding companies
are for." (Affidavit of Evan J. Lister.)

At that time, James A. Wardle gave Evan J. Lister a disputed amount of money (either $20.00 or $25.00) in the
presence of J. D. Hagman. (Ex. "B" and "C", plaintiffs'
memorandum. )
Correspondence was then commenced by J. Harlan
Burns and J. D. Hagman, beginning on February 8, 1962,
by a letter from Mr. Burns to Mr. Hagman stating the
wage claims of plaintiffs herein. (Ex. "D", plaintiffs'
memorandum.) Other correspondence followed (Ex. "E"
and "F", plaintiffs' memorandum) and on March 14,
1962, J. D. Hagman Jr., admitted the claim, but proposed settlement in amounts less than plaintiffs had demanded in their letter of February 8, 1962. (Ex. "G",
plaintiffs' memorandum.)
Plaintiffs did not feel the proposed settlement represented the true claims and filed suit against James A.
Wardle, dba, James A. Wardle Construction Co., whereupon a Default Judgment was obtained against said company of June 12, 1962, (Ex. "3", plaintiffs' memorandum) and attempts were made to secure payment on said
Judgment, but these attempts proved to be futile. (Ex.
"H", "I", "J", and "K", plaintiffs' memorandum.)
]. D. Hagman Jr. addressed another letter to plain-
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tiffs' attorney on October 16, 1962, and reasserted his position that the claims were due and again offered settlement. (Ex. "L", plaintiffs' memorandum.) Plaintiffs
again contested the amounts of said claims and brought
suit against Insurance Adjustment, Inc., on December 12
1962. Great American Insurance Company did not choose'
to join in this suit and defend on the merits, but proceeded
to have the suit dismissed on the grounds that Insurance
Adjustment Co. was an independent contractor and
proper service was not made. (Ex. "M", plaintiffs' memorandum.)
The suit against Insurance Adjustment, Inc., was dismissed on Motion for Summary Judgment; the order being granted on August 1, 1961, whereupon plaintiffs filed
suit against the Great American Insurance Company.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFFS' ,
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE LIMITATION
PERIOD IN DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE POLICY.
Defendant contends that plaintiffs' cause of action
is barred because suit was not brought within the six
month limitation period in its insurance policy.
This conteniton cannot be upheld as a matter of Law.
Although plaintiffs do not dispute the fact that suit
was not filed against this defendant within said six month
limitation period, plaintiffs contend that defendants
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waived this limitation provision and are estopped to assert it.
In the Colorado case of Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Hummer, 36 Colo. 208, 84 P. 61
( 1906), the plaintiff brought an action under an insurance policy which contained a six month limitation bar.
The company, through its agent, required certain proofs
of facts from the plaintiff and sent these on to its home
office with a compromise of settlement offer from the
plaintiff. The claim was rejected after the six month
period of limitation had passed, and the Court determined that these facts were sufficient to constitute a waiver on the part of the insurance company.
The case of David v. Oakland Home Ins. Co., 11
Wash. 181, 39 P 443 ( 1895) is still good law in Washington and in that matter the action was on an insurance policy with a six month limitation provision. Defendant's
adjuster visited the plaintiff; plaintiff was notified that
the adjuster would call again; plaintiff's offers for a settlement were rejected; no specific offer was made by defendant and the plaintiff was led to believe that there
had been no final decision until after the six months had
elapsed, when defendant denied all liability. The Court
said that defendant, by its actions, waived the condition
as to suit in six months.
In Reynolds v. Detroit Fidelity and Surety Co., 19
F, 2d 110 ( 1927), the court said that a waiver of a limitation may be effected if an insurer's conduct has been such
as to mislead the insured or throw him off guard, if reasonable hopes of adjustment have been held out, if the
question of adjustment has been left open, or if delay in
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bringing action has been inducted to enable the insurer to
investigate the claim.
Whether the insurance company has waived the provisions of its limitation period depends on the facts of
each particular case and there are numerous and varied
cases cited in 29 A.LR. 2d 636 which stand for the proposition that certain acts of insurance companies or their
agents can cause a waiver or estoppel.
In the instant case, the defendant gathered its own
information concerning the validity of the wage claims involved. Said defendant then informed plaintiffs, within
the six month limitation period, that its figures would be
submitted for immediate consideration of payment if said
figures were acceptable to plaintiffs. At that time, de·
fendant's agent asked for more information concerning a
claim of one of the plaintiffs herein. Thereafter, when the
six month limitation period had passed, defendant in·
formed plaintiffs that payments, in the amounts suggested
by the company, had been approved and said defendant
again inquired of plaintiff as to whether said amounts
were acceptable. Shortly after the latter correspondence
plaintiffs filed suit against the Insurance Adjustment
Company for a determination of the correct amounts of
said wage claims. These wage claims were never rejected
by Insurance Adjustment Inc. or Great American Insur·
ance Company; both parties being content to rest their
defenses on technical errors which they led plaintiffs into
committing.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFFS'
FAVOR.
It is plaintiffs' contention that their motion for Summary Judgment should be granted for the cause and reason that these claims are legally due and owing; that defendant had knowledge of said claims, admitted said
claims in lesser amounts, and proposed settlement, by and
through its agent, both before and after the six month
limitation in its bond; that plaintiffs were led to believe
reasonable settlement was forthcoming; that defendant
knew of the suit between its agent, Insurance Adjustment
Inc., and plaintiffs herein, but defendant chose not to
defend said suit on the merits, but chose instead to wait
until plaintiffs brought suit specifically against said defendant and plead its six month limitation period; that
said six months limitation period is void under 31-19-19,
U.C.A. ( 1953).
Defendant contends that the claims of plaintiffs are
barred by its six month limitation period in the insurance
contract. This contention cannot be asserted in Utah.
31-19-19 U.C.A. (1953) follows in part:
VOID CONDITIONS, STIPULATIONS OR
AGREEMENTS.
( 1) No insurance contract delivered or issued for
delivery in this state and covering subjects located,
resident or to be performed in this state shall contain any condition, stipulation or agreement.
( c) limiting right of action against the insurer
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to a period of less than one year from the time
when the cause of action accrues in connection
with all insurance other than property and marine
and transportation insurance.

( d) Any such condition, stipulation, or agreement shall be void, but such voiding shall not effect
the validity of the other provisions of the contract.
The bond issued in the instant case was issued by
Great American Insurance Company, wherein said insurance company is proclaimed to be the Surety. The
bond is express in its application for the benefit of laborers and purports to indemnify them on default. The bond
is an insurance contract because it undertakes to indemnify another or pay or allow a specified or ascertainable
amount or benefit upon a determinable risk, (Section 311-7 Utah Code Ann. (1953), and The Great American
Insurance Company is an "insurer" under Section 31-1-10
Utah Code Ann. ( 1953)). Therefore this bond comes under the insurance code and is subject to Utah Code Ann.
31-19-19 supra, and the limitation period in said bond
is void.
CONCLUSION
The limitation period is void and plaintiffs have
been diligently pursuing this action since the inception of
their claims. The claims of plaintiffs have been found le·
gally due and owing by a default judgment in the Fourth
Judicial District in and for the County of Utah. Defen·
dant has never chosen to defend this suit on its merits, but
has chosen instead to rest defense on the six month limita·
tion period, which this defendant is estopped to assert and
which is void under Utah law.
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The undisputed facts demonstrate plaintiffs' right to
prevail under the law above set forth and Summary Judgment should be granted in plaintiff's favor.
Respectfully submitted,
BURNS AND PARK
by: -------------------------------------------]. HARLAN BURNS
Attorney for Appellant
95 North Main Street
Cedar City, Utah 84 720

